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THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF AVIATORS AND
RELATED ISSUES OF MIXED CRIMINAL-CIVIL
LITIGATION: "A VENTURE IN THE
TWILIGHT ZONE"
PHILLIP J. KOLCZYNSKI*
I. THE "TWILIGHT ZONE" ACCIDENT
ON JULY 23, 1982, at approximately 2:20 A.M. PDT, a
Bell UH-1B helicopter crashed in Valencia, California,
just north of the San Fernando Valley.' Actor Vic Morrow
and two child actors died in the accident. 2 The crash oc-
curred during the filming of the Warner Brothers produc-
tion of "Twilight Zone: The Movie," directed by John
* Mr. Kolczynski, who specializes in aviation and other complex civil litigation,
is a partner in the law firm Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, Los Angeles, California.
Prior to joining the firm he served as a trial attorney in the Aviation Unit of the
Torts Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. A
member of the bars of California, Ohio, and the District of Columbia, he is also a
member of the usual aviation and litigation bar associations. Mr. Kolczynski grad-
uated from Marquette University in 1969, with a B.A. in psychology, and from
Case Western Reserve University School of Law in December 1976, where he was
the notes editor of the Journal of International Law. He has published several
articles, including "Admiralty Jurisdiction over Aviation Tort Claims," "Govern-
ment Liability for the Certification of Aircraft," "Depositions as Evidence" in the
ABA's LITIGATION JOURNAL, and "How to Take Videotape Deposiions" in THE
BRIEF, the ABA tort law periodical. Before entering law school, Mr. Kolcynski was
a Marine Corps F-4 Phantom pilot and currently holds a FAA Commercial Single-
engine license with Multi-engine and Instrument Ratings.
The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance ofJames E. Barnes
in the research and preparation of this article while Mr. Barnes was a third year
law student at Pepperdine School of Law. Mr. Barnes is now a practicing attorney
in Santa Monica, California.
I N.T.S.B. Aircraft Accident Report (AAR-84/02) 1.
2 Id. at 5.
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Landis, Steven Spielberg, George Miller, and Joe Dante.
The movie, a cinematic statement against bigotry, in-
cluded a scene recreating a nighttime heavy ordnance at-
tack against a Vietnamese village. The crash occurred
during the filming of this scene. The "Huey" was being
used as a camera, machine gun, and spotlight platform as
well as playing an active role in the film. The pilot,
Dorcey Wingo, Director of Operations for Western Heli-
copter Corp., in Rialto, California, had been hired by the
movie production staff to fly these sequences.5
The story line called for Morrow, in the role of a
drunken bigot, to wander into a different "dimension of
sight, sound and mind" where he experienced himself be-
ing hunted as a jew by Nazis, as a black man by the Ku
Klux Klan, and in the accident scene, as an American sol-
dier in Vietnam mistaken for a Viet Cong during a night-
time helicopter strafing attack on a village. The accident
scene involved a helicopter flying along a river and slow-
ing to a hover approximately twenty-five feet over the
river adjacent to the village while a machine gunner shot
into the village.6 As the scene unfolded, Vic Morrow
waved to the Huey, as if he initially believed it to be
friendly. When he realized that those aboard the helicop-
ter had mistaken him for a Viet Cong, he picked up two
Vietnamese children, played by a six year old Chinese girl
and a seven year old Vietnamese boy, and attempted to
flee across the river carrying the children.7 As the actor
waded into the river, simulated explosions started to go
off in the village and the hovering helicopter performed a
slow pedal turn, allowing the film unit production coordi-
nator to keep the spotlight focused on the fleeing actor.
The accident occurred when a special-effects device
made up of a mixture of gasoline and sawdust failed to
, Id.
4 Id. at 1.
s Id. at 22.
6 Id. at 1.
7 Id. at 2.
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detonate on the ground, but was propelled instead into
the air where it erupted into a fireball and engulfed the
tail section of the helicopter.8 The National Transporta-
tion Safety Board ("NTSB") determined that heat from
the fireball or the debris from the explosion caused the
tail rotor assembly to separate from the tail boom, and
caused the Huey to go into wild gyrations as it descended
out of control.9 The special-effects technician who deto-
nated the accident-causing charge told the NTSB and the
grand jury, while testifying under a grant of immunity,
that he paid attention only to the location of the actors
and not the helicopter when he fired the charges.' 0
The death of Vic Morrow and the involvement of well-
known director John Landis contributed to the accident
becoming a media event. Criminal charges of involuntary
manslaughter have been filed against the director, assis-
tant director, unit production coordinator, special-effects
coordinator, and the pilot." Additional charges of child
endangerment and conspiracy have focused solely on the
movie production people.' 2
The FAA has begun an administrative enforcement ac-
tion to revoke the pilot's license.' 3 The Occupational
Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) for the State of Cali-
fornia has filed charges against the organizations in-
volved.' 4 Wrongful death actions have been filed against
all parties on behalf of the decedents and insurance com-
panies are trying to unravel the complicated coverage
provided to Warner Brothers and Western Helicopters.




Charges pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 192.2 (West 1970) were filed in the
Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles (Case No. A-391583).
12 Charges were filed in the above numbered case pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 871.5 (West 1970).
Is Proceeding Before N.T.S.B., Office of Admin. Law Judges, Docket No. SE-
5890 (Cir. I).
,1 Proceeding Before Cal. O.S.H. Appeals Board, OSHA Docket No. 82-R5DI,
1172-1180.
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ministrative litigation, this article will analyze the stan-
dards by which aviators may be held criminally liable and
the cross-over issues involved in such multi-faceted
litigation.
II. THE TREND TO PROSECUTE AVIATORS
Over the past several years, a growing trend to prose-
cute aviators for criminal offenses has become apparent.
The trend is part of a greater movement to hold profes-
sionals and corporations criminally accountable for their
unintentional but allegedly criminal conduct. Profession-
als and corporations have never been immune from crimi-
nal culpability based on their status alone,1 5 and the
willingness of society to assess criminal penalties is on the
rise.
The most famous criminal prosecution of a corporation
may have been Indiana v. Ford Motor Co. ,6 where the state
prosecuted the car company for the unintentional deaths
of three girls who were killed while riding in a Ford Pinto.
The girls died when the gasoline tank in their car ex-
ploded after a van, which sustained virtually no damage,
struck the rear of the Pinto. Documents in the custody of
Ford supposedly indicated that company management
knew of the possibility that Pintos might explode if struck
from behind, but chose to forego the necessary correc-
tions and expenditures that would have made the car
safer. Ford Motor Corporation was prosecuted for reck-
less homicide, 17 but the state could not persuade the jury
and Ford was acquitted. 8
Seegenerally E. Ross, SIN AND SocIETY (1907); E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR
CRIME (1949).
1 No. 11-431 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1980).
17 Id. The state sought indictments against Ford executives as well as the cor-
poration itself, but the grand jury returned only the single indictment against
Ford. Id.
18 Id. For an account of the entire case, see L. STROBEL, RECKLESS HOMICIDE?
FORD'S PINTO TRIAL (1980). See also Cullen, Maatestad, & Cavender, The Ford Pinto
Case and Beyond: Corporate Crime, Moral Boundaries, and the Criminal Sanction, in COR-
PORATIONS AS CRIMINALS 107 (E. Hochestedler ed. 1984).
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The Indiana v. Ford case illustrates a growing willingness
of the state to prosecute corporations and professionals.
This willingness has been recognized by legal scholars,' 9
by the general public, 20 and by executives and profession-
als themselves. 21 Legislators, by enacting laws which hold
corporate officials strictly liable for a variety of wrongs,
further reflect this trend.22 With respect to aviation pro-
fessionals, the willingness of governments to prosecute af-
ter an accident has increased more rapidly abroad than it
has domestically.23
19 Kramer, Corporate Criminality: The Development of an Idea, in CORPOIATIONS AS
CRIMINALS 13 (E. Hochestedler ed. 1984).
20 See, e.g., Crime in the Suites: On the Rise, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 3, 1979, at 114; Corpo-
rate Crime: The Untold Story, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Sept. 6, 1982, at 25.
21 See, e.g., How Lawless Are Big Companies?, FORTUNE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 56. A sur-
vey of 1,043 corporations revealed that 117 companies were held criminally liable
for committing 163 offenses in areas such as bribery, including kickbacks and ille-
gal rebates, criminal fraud, illegal political contributions, tax evasion, and criminal
anti-trust violations. Each of the cases were disposed of by guilty verdicts, guilty
or nolo contendere pleas, or consent decrees. Id.
22 Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses - Another
View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1982).
23 In 1956, a French DC-6 crashed prior to its scheduled landing at Cairo Air-
port, and fifty-two persons were killed. Despite his resulting conviction for invol-
untary homicide, the pilot was fined only 5,000 francs.
In 1964, the pilot of a TWA Boeing 707 was charged with criminal negligence
when his plane overshot a runway in Rome after an aborted takeoff which killed
forty-five people. The defendant pilot was eventually exonerated.
A Boeing 727 crashed on approach to the Taipei International Airport, Taiwan
in 1968, killing twenty-four people. Taiwanese authorities charged the pilot and a
crew member with manslaughter, and charged the pilot alone with professional
negligence. An accident board concluded that the accident had resulted from the
negligence of the pilot and a crew member. They were committed to prison, but a
criminal court later acquitted them and they were released from custody.
In 1976, a British Airways Trident 3 and an Inex-Adria McDonnell-Douglas DC-
9 were involved in a mid-air collision which killed 176 people. Eight Yugoslavian
air traffic controllers were tried for criminal negligence. One was found guilty
and served two and a half years in prison.
In 1983, a Swissair first officer and captain were sentenced to two years and four
years, respectively, for manslaughter, criminal negligence, and interruption of air
traffic following a 1979 accident in Athens, Greece, in which fourteen people died.
The crash occurred when a DC-8 jetliner went off the runway and caught fire
during a tricky night landing in the rain. Despite extenuating circumstances sug-
gesting contributory fault by the airport, the airmen were sentenced to prison.
Recently, each man's punishment was reduced from imprisonment to a fine. See
Van Wijk, Criminal Liability of Pilots Following an Airline Accident: A History of the Issue
Within the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA), 9 AIR L. 66,
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In the United States, there is a dearth of reported cases
of criminal prosecutions of aviators. 24 Of the cases re-
ported, all but one involved at least one death and were
prosecuted under state manslaughter or negligent homi-
cide laws. Although most states have some statute that
prohibits reckless flying,25 there are few reported cases re-
66-68 (1984); Jones, Criminal Prosecution of Civil Airmen Following Aircraft Accident. A
Dangerous Trend, I AIR & SPACE LAW. 8 (1984) [hereinafter "Jones"].
24 Perhaps there are few reported homicide prosecutions of pilots because,
when one considers their seating positions, pilots are usually the first ones to pay
for their mistakes.
25 Most states have either adopted the language of the Uniform State Law for
Aeronautics or some comparable variation thereof. Arizona's statute is
representative:
A. An aeronaut or passenger who, while in flight over a densely
inhabited area or over a public gathering within this state, engages
in trick or acrobatic flying, or in any acrobatic feat, or, except while
in landing or taking off, flies at such a low level as to endanger per-
sons on the surface beneath, or drops any object except loose water,
loose sand ballast or loose sheets of paper, is guilty of a class 1
misdemeanor.
B. No person may operate an aircraft in the air, or on the ground
or water while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics
or other drug, nor operate an aircraft in the air, or on the ground or
water in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or
property of another. In determining whether the operation was
careless or reckless, the court shall consider the standards for safe
operation of aircraft prescribed by federal statutes or regulations
governing aeronautics. Any person violating any provision of this
subsection is guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1744 (Supp. 1983).
States adopting similar statutes are: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 4-2-10 (1981)),
Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 02.30.040 (Supp. 1984)), Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 74-
109 (1979)), California (CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21407 (West 1965)), Delaware
(DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 309 (1975)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 2-5 (1982)),
Hawaii (HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 263-9, 263-11 (1976)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN.
§ 8-21-4-8 (Burns 1980)), Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 328.41 (West Supp. 1983)),
Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 202(9) (1979)), Maryland (MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 5-1006 (1977)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 61-11-1 (1973)), Missouri
(Mo. ANN. STAT. § 305.080 (Vernon 1971)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 67-1-
204 (1983)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § § 493.100, 493.130 (1979)), North Caro-
lina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-18 (1981)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-3-
100 (Law. Co-op. 1977)), South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 50-13-16
(1983)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 42-1-201 (1980)), Virginia (VA. CODE
§ 5.1-13 (1983)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 14.04.220 (1964)), West
Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 29-214-12 (1980)).
State laws that have not followed the Uniform Law format include: Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15-72 (West 1960)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 860-13
(West Supp. 1983)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 21-1.12 (1977)), Minnesota (MINN.
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flecting prosecution of a pilot under such a law. 26
The first reported case of the prosecution of an aviator
was the 1927 case of People v. Crossan.27 The defendant
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter when the air-
plane that he operated struck and killed two girls.28
Crossan flew along a California beach at an altitude esti-
mated to be between forty and one hundred fifty feet.29
When his engine quit, he initially tried to land on the
sand, but there were too many people in the area. When
he attempted to turn toward the ocean, he lost control in
the brisk onshore wind and came down on the sunbathers.
The appellate court reversed Crossan's conviction be-
cause the trial court improperly admitted evidence that
the defendant had previously been involved in several in-
stances of dangerous low-altitude flying.3 In addition to
creating unfair prejudice, the prior conduct evidence was
unnecessary since eyewitnesses testified about the con-
duct of the defendant at the time of the accident.3 1
Although the appellate court overturned the defendant's
conviction, it expressly approved the jury instruction
which recited the statutory requirements for
manslaughter. 2
STAT. ANN. § 360.075 (West 1966)), New York (N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 245 (Mc-
Kinney 1982)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4561.15 (Page 1982)), Oregon
(OR. REV. STAT. § 493.160 (1983)), Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 185 (1972))
and Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. ANN. § 114.09 (West 1974)).
Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3405 (1981)) and Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:98.1 (West 1974)) deal with reckless piloting under the same statute which
punishes reckless driving. Overwhelmingly, states treat the violation of a reckless
flying statute as a misdemeanor.
Many states statutorily forbid operating aircraft while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs. These states do this by prohibiting such conduct in the reckless
flying statutes. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 8-21-4-8 (Burns 1980); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. § 50-13-17 (1983).
2 ' Jones, supra note 23, at 9.
27 87 Cal. App. 5, 261 P. 531 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
2, 261 P. at 532.
211 Id. at 534.
- Id. at 534-36.
I1 d.
32 Id. at 532-33. California's manslaughter statute in effect at the time provided
that one could be guilty of manslaughter from "the commission of a lawful act
1985]
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In 1929, New York City authorities charged a pilot with
manslaughter when he ran out of fuel and attempted a
forced water landing near Coney Island.3 3 Despite the ef-
forts of the pilot, the plane ran up on the beach where it
struck and killed a young girl. The court granted the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the complaint because the
prosecution had failed to make out a prima facie case of
culpable negligence. 4
The holding in the 1951 case of Maryland v. Chapman15
raises questions about prosecutorial discretion. The de-
fendant, an Air Force officer3 6 and experienced pilot, was
flying a B-25 normally used for training flights. The pilot
and flight engineer were responsible for testing an aircraft
that had just been repaired to correct faulty landing gear.
During the flight, the pilot discovered that the landing
gear would not extend despite several attempts to lower
it. After ruling out an attempt to crash land the plane, the
pilot's superiors instructed him to pass over the air field
which might produce death, . . . without due caution and circumspection." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 192 (2) (1872) (amended 1945).
The court approved the trial court's instruction which charged the jury that if it
found that operating an airplane might produce death, and that the defendant
operated the airplane without due caution and circumspection, the defendant
must be found guilty. The court held that the instruction was proper even though
the trial court did not define the term "due caution and circumspection." 261 P. at
533.
At least four states have reckless flying statutes which can convict an aviator for
operation of an aircraft "without due caution and circumspection." See, e.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 259.180 (West 1977).
. People v. Alexander, 1929 U.S. Av. Rep. 56 (City Magistrate's Ct. of N.Y.
1929).
The trial judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss after listening to the
testimony of the defendant and taking a demonstration flight during which the
episode was recreated. The defendant's testimony tended to show that everything
possible was done to avoid the accident. The judge seemed to be impressed both
with the good faith of the defendant and with the flight demonstration, and con-
cluded that a finding of culpable negligence was not warranted where the pilot did
his best to avoid the accident.
34 Id.
35 101 F. Supp. 335 (D. Md. 1951).
36 After indictment by the Prince George's County, Maryland grand jury, the
case was removed to federal district court because the defendant was an Air Force
officer acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the inci-
dent. Id. at 337.
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(Andrews Field) and have the co-pilot and engineer bail
out. Pursuant to instructions, the pilot made a final pass
over the airfield headed in the direction of the Chesa-
peake Bay and bailed out while over the field. Jet planes
were to follow the unmanned B-25 to the bay where they
would shoot it down. Shortly after the pilot bailed out,
however, the plane unexpectedly circled to the left and
crashed into a house killing three people.
In the ensuing trial, the court determined that the only
applicable manslaughter statute dealt with vehicular man-
slaughter and found the defendant not guilty.38 The pros-
ecutor failed to prove criminal negligence which required
a showing of gross negligence beyond a reasonable
doubt.3 9  The court distinguished simple negligence,
which could support a civil verdict, from the gross negli-
gence required for a criminal conviction.40
In State v. Bahl41 the defendant pilot and his passenger
decided to go for an airplane ride after spending the after-
noon visiting taverns. 42 The pilot made several low alti-
tude passes over an industrial plant, eventually hitting
high wires. The resulting crash killed his passenger. The
court accepted the argument of the prosecution that viola-
tion of the Iowa reckless flying statute43 sufficiently paral-
leled a violation of the state's reckless driving statute to
support a manslaughter conviction.4 4 The conviction was
affirmed on appeal.4 5
37 Id. at 338-39.
38 Id. at 341.
39 Id.
40 Id. "[T]he law is reasonably clear that a charge of manslaughter by negli-
gence is not made out by proof of ordinary simple negligence that would consti-
tute civil liability. . . . [Tihe amount or degree or character of the negligence to
be proven in a criminal case is gross negligence . "Id.
4, 242 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976).
42 Id. at 300. The defendant was apparently not aware of an unwritten cardinal
rule of aviation - "Eight hours from bottle to throttle."
43 IOWA CODE ANN. § 328.41 (West Supp. 1985) prohibits "careless or reckless"
flying.
44 State v. Bahi, 242 N.W.2d at 303-04.
4-1 The court accepted the common law definition for manslaughter: "The un-
lawful killing of another without malice expressed or implied." Id. at 300.
1985]
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In Ward v. State46 police arrested the defendant, a solo
student pilot, following a flight in which he "buzzed"
apartment buildings. A blood-alcohol test established the
pilot's blood-alcohol level at 0.17 percent.4 7 The State of
Maryland prosecuted him and obtained a conviction for
violation of its reckless flying statute.48  Because there is
no double jeopardy for a subsequent federal prosecution,
the Federal Aviation Administration suspended his
license.4 0
Ward is important because it is the only reported crimi-
nal decision which discusses federal preemption of state
law. In the state court proceeding, the defendant argued
that the Federal Aviation Act of 195850 preempted the
state statute. The court rejected the argument, holding
that no actual conflict between state and federal law ex-
isted.5 ' Congress had not acted to control the entire field
of aeronautics, the court concluded, but had instead left
room for some state regulation.5 2 The legislative history
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 revealed a lack of con-
gressional interest in eclipsing state laws prescribing pun-
ishable offenses, the court noted. The Federal Aviation
46 280 Md. 485, 374 A.2d 1118 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
47 374 A.2d at 1120. When driving a motor vehicle, a blood alcohol level of
0.13 percent or greater is prima facie evidence of intoxication in Maryland. MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307(e) (1984).
48 Ward, 374 A.2d at 1118-19. Maryland's reckless flying statute is currently
codified in MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 5-1006 (1977). It prohibits both reckless
flying and operating an aircraft while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Id.
49 Ward, 374 A.2d at 1120. In the subsequent FAA enforcement action, Ward
was found to be in violation of Federal Aviation Regulation 91.9, which provides
that "[n]o person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to
endanger the life or property of another." 14 C.F.R. § 91.9 (1984). His license
was suspended, subject to re-issuance after six months. Ward, 374 A. 2d at 1120.
-0 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1501 (1982).
.- Ward, 374 A.2d at 1120-25.
I d. at 1123-24. The leading preemption case in the aviation field is City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (federal law which
controls noise levels and is governed by the FAA in conjunction with the Environ-
mental Protection Agency preempts local noise ordinance).
.- Ward, 374 A.2d at 1124. "The offenses punishable under this legislation
would not replace any State jurisdiction but would, where both Federal and State
law provided for punishment for the same act, be in addition to the State criminal
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Act set criminal penalties for only selected crimes,54 the
court pointed out, whereas the state retained police
power to penalize aviation related crimes.5 5
In Pritchett v. State56 a passenger in the plane piloted by
the defendant died in a crash following the pilot's re-
peated "buzzing" of a populated motel which caused
people on the ground to dive for cover. The defendant
claimed that he had experienced mechanical difficulties at
the time of the incident, but his conviction for manslaugh-
ter was affirmed on appeal. 57 The court found the con-
duct of the pilot so egregious that it described his
behavior to be of " 'a gross and flagrant character, evinc-
ing reckless disregard of human life.' "158
The foregoing examination of cases illustrates that
prosecutors are occasionally justified but not always con-
sistent in seeking retribution for greater than negligent
conduct. Unfortunately, states sometimes react to the na-
ture of the tragedy and the spectacular circumstances of
an aviation accident rather than the conduct involved. 59
The gravity of harm done should not govern the determi-
nation of a defendant's culpability. Aircraft accidents by
their nature often lead to tragic consequences. Independ-
ent of the level of tragedy attending a particular incident,
the question must be asked whether simple or gross negli-
gence should be treated in the same manner as reckless,
willful, or wanton behavior merely because an actor is in-
volved in an activity with such potential for disaster of
enormous proportions.
law." H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2563, 2564.
-1 See 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i)-(p) (1982).
5 See Ward, 374 A.2d at 1122-25. See also MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 5-103(a)
(1977) which provides that "[t]he law of this State defines and governs all crimes,
torts, and other wrongs committed in flights over this State."
56 414 So. 2d 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
57 Id. at 3.
-58 Id. (quoting Filmon v. State, 336 So. 2d 586, 589 (Fla. 1976), appeal dismissed,
430 U.S. 980 (1977), reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 960 (1977)).
- See supra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
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III. STANDARDS OF LIABILITY
The levels of culpability under which a party may be
held criminally liable range from simple negligence to de-
liberate, intentional acts. Gross negligence and wanton,
reckless conduct lie somewhere between. Instead of defi-
nite intermediate levels of culpable conduct clearly delin-
eated by .specific tests, the distinctions are undefined.
This leads to a lack of uniformity in the application of
criminal laws and unjust results.
Aviation clients may suffer quasi-criminal sanctions for
conduct which is merely negligent and which would other-
wise merit only civil damages. Such conduct may be con-
strued as a more serious form of negligence, possibly
giving rise to "extraordinary ' 60 damages. Furthermore,
such conduct, particularly that giving rise to punitive
damages, may be the basis for criminal charges and crimi-
nal penalties. Practitioners should recognize the poten-
tial for criminal actions against aviators in situations
where punitive damages may be assessed. As will be
demonstrated below, considerable confusion and uncer-
tainty dominate the area of the law governing requisite
levels of culpability. A more uniform approach for deter-
mining when to bring criminal charges is needed, and a
few recommendations will also follow.
1. Simple Negligence
Simple negligence is the least culpable level of criminal
conduct,6' and is usually defined as the failure to exercise
ordinary care.62 In order to be actionable, the culpable
conduct must be that "which falls below a standard estab-
o Throughout the article, the terms "punitive damages" and "extraordinary
damages" will be used interchangeably. In either case, the terms are used to de-
scribe damages assessed against a defendant for the purpose of punishment.
6 However, strict liability (without negligence) can serve as the basis for both
civil and criminal liability. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
Although strict liability is outside the scope of this article, an excellent treatment
can be found in Brickey, supra note 22.
62 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 21 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
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lished by the law for the protection of others against un-
reasonable risk of harm."63  Important elements of
negligence include forseeability of the risk and unreason-
able conduct.
In the aviation context, violations of regulations, oper-
ating procedures, or customs and practices of the industry
usually constitute a breach of the duty to exercise ordi-
nary care. 64 Ordinarily, common carriers are held to the
highest degree of care.65 Private carriers, on the other




A consideration of cases involving aggravated forms of
negligence makes clear that no fine demarcation point dis-
tinguishing various levels and degrees of negligence ex-
ists. Courts use a variety of descriptive terms seemingly
without apparent consideration for the precise kind of
conduct being condemned. Such lack of clarity and preci-
sion is particularly troublesome since this area of the law
already suffers from great confusion when distinguishing
aggravated civil liability from criminal culpability.
Gross negligence has been defined by Professor Prosser
as "failure to exercise even that care which a careless per-
son would use."'67 Gross negligence, although more cul-
pable than simple negligence, falls short of reckless
disregard and differs from ordinary negligence only in de-
gree. 68 Some states have attempted to define gross negli-
63 Id. at 170.
E.g., In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982).
65 Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488, 491 (8th Cir. 1959) (common
carrier required to operate under highest degree of care); Haldane v. Alaska Air-
lines, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 224, 266 (D. Alaska 1954) (common carrier liable for
slightest negligence); DeVito v. United Air Lines,-Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88, 97 (E.D.
N.Y. 1951) (carrier owed highest duty of care to passengers).
66 Jackson v. Stancil, 253 N.C. 291, 116 S.E.2d 817, 922 (1960) (specifically
distinguishing between the duty owed by a common carrier and that owed by a
private carrier).
67 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 62, at 212.
68 Id.
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gence by statute,69 but much of the law in this area was
created in response to automobile guest statutes, which
permit gratuitous passengers to recover damages from
drivers only in cases of gross negligence or some other
form of aggravated misconduct. 70  Due to the varied re-
sponses of courts to guest statues, 71 applications of the
gross negligence standard have been inconsistent.
The states are split over when and whether to allow an
award of punitive damages to accompany a finding of
gross negligence. Some jurisdictions allow the imposition
of punitive damages for gross negligence. 72 Others re-
quire conduct which is willful, wanton, reckless, or mali-
cious. 73 Although a great number of states require some
form of malicious conduct before awarding punitive dam-
ages,'7  courts will often infer malice where willful, wan-
- See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 105-203 (1984) (defined in terms of failure to exer-
cise even "slight diligence"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 6 (West 1955) (" 'Slight
negligence' consists in the want of great care and diligence, 'ordinary negligence'
is the want of ordinary care and diligence, and 'gross negligence' is the want of
slight care and diligence.").
70 See, e.g., Muhn v. Shell, 196 Kan. 713, 413 P.2d 997 (1966); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 321.494 (West 1973) (repealed 1974).
7, See Note, The Case Against the Guest Statute, 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 321, 328-29
(1966); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 62, at 216.
72 See, e.g., Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013, 1018
(1977); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1979).
71 See, e.g., Ebaugh v. Raftin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 894, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 708
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972) ("mere negligence, even gross negligence is not sufficient to
justify an award of punitive damages"); Stern v. Abramson, 150 N.J. Super. 571,
574, 376 A.2d 221, 223 (1977) ("Although gross negligence may approach the
realm of an aggravated intentional act, it fails to reach this nadir. A distinction
exists between gross negligence and willful and wanton behavior. And even
where negligence is so extreme in degree as to be characterized as gross, punitive
damages are not recoverable."); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1984) ("In
an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition
to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way
of punishing the defendant."). But see, e.g., Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan.
506, 525, 582 P.2d 1136, 1150 (1978); Inland Container Corp. v. March, 529
S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tenn. 1975).
74 See, e.g., Silberg v. Calif. Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103,
113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974) ("defendant must be guilty of oppression, fraud or
malice"); Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 435-36 (Fla. 1978) (act
"committed in an outrageous manner or with fraud, malice, wantonness or op-
pression"); General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810, 817
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ton, or reckless conduct is involved.75 It is in the twilight
zone between civil and criminal liability that the question
must be asked whether gross negligence should result in
criminal prosecution. If the answer is in the negative, the
question for decision becomes how to differentiate be-
tween gross negligence and wanton, reckless conduct.
The Model Penal Code 76 divides unintentional killings
into two sub-classes. The first, manslaughter, is an unin-
tentional homicide committed recklessly. 77 To support a
conviction for manslaughter, there must have existed a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of homicide, and the ac-
tor must have perceived the risk yet ignored it. 78 A find-
ing of negligent homicide 79 requires only that the actor
disregarded a risk of which he should have been aware.8 0
The actor need not have actually perceived a risk of harm;
if he or she should have perceived the risk of death, then a
guilty verdict may result. Note that the Model Penal Code
defines criminal negligence as a "gross deviation from the
standard of care.""' Whether the drafters of the Model
Penal Code intended to equate gross negligence and
criminal negligence is uncertain, but the likelihood that
some courts will reach such an inference is real. 2
3. Willful, Wanton, and Reckless Conduct
As the level of culpability increases, the standards
describing forms of negligence become increasingly mud-
(1976) (requirement of "fraud, malice, evil intent or oppression" as part of the
wrongful act); King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 S.C. 259, 251 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1979)
(requirement of "malice, ill will or a conscious indifference to the rights of
others").
75 See, e.g., Satterfield v. Rebsamen Ford Inc., 253 Ark. 181, 485 S.W.2d 192
(1972).
76 MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft 1980).
77 Id. § 210.3.
78 Id. § 210.3 comment.
79 Id. § 210.4.
80 Id. § 210.4 comment.
81 Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
"' One court has said that "[a] gross deviation under the statutory definition is
analogous to gross negligence in the law of torts." State v. Bier, 181 Mont. 27,
32, 591 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1979).
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dled. All too often, "willful", "wanton", and "reckless",
and the conduct defined by those words, are used inter-
changeably.8 3 Although the conduct so described sounds
egregious, and despite the suggestion of malice conveyed
by the word "wanton", many in the law have lumped
these types of conduct together with gross negligence.84
Three sources or kinds of sources offer guidance for the
determination of what constitutes willful, wanton, or reck-
less conduct in the aviation context: 1) aviation guest stat-
utes, 2) tort liability recovery limitations for international
flights imposed by the Warsaw Convention, 85 and 3)
NTSB decisions affirming FAA enforcement of "the care-
less and reckless" rule - FAR 9 1.9.86
Some states have aviation guest statutes similar to auto-
mobile guest statutes.87 Where such a statute exists, a
guest passenger must prove some form of aggravated
negligence in order to recover.88 Some statutes require a
showing of gross negligence, while others require that the
passenger prove willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.
Although there have been relatively few cases interpreting
such statutes, 89  there is a trend to hold them
83 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 102 (1971).
84 "[T]here is often no clear distinction between [reckless, willful, or wanton]
conduct and 'gross' negligence, and the two have tended to merge and take on the
same meaning, of an aggravated form of negligence . PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 62, at 214.
85 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1969, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
11 (1934), reprinted at 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw
Convention].
86 Federal Aviation Regulation 91.9, 14 C.F.R. § 91.9 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as FAR 91.9]. FAR 91.9 provides that "[n]o person may operate an aircraft in a
careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another."
87 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 30.115 ("No person transported by the owner
or operator of an aircraft or a watercraft as his guest without payment for such
transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against the owner or op-
erator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless the accident was inten-
tional on the part of the owner or operator or caused by his gross negligence or
intoxication.").
88 See id
89 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, 2 AVIATION TORT LAW § 12:8 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as SPEISER & KRAUSE].
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unconstitutional."
On international flights, if an aviator is guilty of willful
misconduct, provisions of the Warsaw Convention limit-
ing tort liability will not apply. 9' A finding of willful mis-
conduct requires a showing of conscious intent to commit
an act which harms another, or an intentional omission to
perform a manifest duty. 92 Generally, such conduct in-
volves a conscious disregard of the consequences of an act
coupled with a realization of the probability that injury
will result.93 This level of misconduct was found under
the Warsaw Convention in one case where an airliner flew
in violation of altitude regulations,9 4 and in another case
where airline employees failed to instruct passengers on
the location of life vests, neglected to broadcast an emer-
gency message after the plane became imperiled, were
unaware of a loss of radio transmission, and failed to initi-
ate a prompt search after the plane went down. 95
FAA enforcement of the federal "careless and reckless"
flying regulation (FAR 91.9),96 offers only questionable
guidance on what may constitute "reckless" behavior in
an aviation setting. Unfortunately, NTSB decisions re-
viewing FAA enforcement actions sometimes produce the
suggestion that aviators found to be "reckless" within the
meaning of FAR 91.9 may be little more than ordinarily
negligent or perhaps grossly negligent. For example, a
,0 Courts that have declared aviation guest statutes to be unconstitutional have
generally employed the same reasoning used in adjudging automotive guest stat-
utes unconstitutional - such statutes may deny equal protection of the law. See,
e.g., Ayer v. Boyle, 37 Cal. App. 3d 822, 827, 112 Cal. Rptr. 636, 639 (1974);
Messmer v. Ker, 96 Idaho 75, 524 P.2d 536, 540 (1974); Longnecker v. Noordyk
Mooney, Inc., 394 Mich. 696, 232 N.W.2d 654 (1975). Some courts, however,
have refused to hold guest statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., Praznik v. Sport
Aero, Inc., 42 Il. App. 3d 330, 355 N.E.2d 686, 693 (1976).
9, Warsaw Convention, supra note 85, at § 25(1).
92 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 89, at § 11:37.
91 E.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd. 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1965).
94 American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
95 Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. KLM v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775, 779-
82 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
96 See supra note 86.
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Western Airlines pilot was found to have violated FAR
91.9 when his aircraft landed in Buffalo, Wyoming instead
of Sheridan, Wyoming as scheduled.97 Neither the pilot
nor first officer had ever flown into Sheridan before,
although each of them believed that the other had. When
the plane approached the Buffalo airport, which lay di-
rectly in its flight path, the pilot and first officer thought
they had arrived at Sheridan, and landed the plane. The
NTSB affirmed the suspension of the pilot by the FAA for
reckless flying and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the NTSB.98
The FAA decided that the pilot exhibited gross disregard
for the safety of others, and accused him of reckless con-
duct. 99 Enforcement of the federal reckless flying regula-
tions demonstrates how federal regulations designed to
punish reckless conduct are often used as a catch-all to
punish simple or ordinary negligence. 10 0
4. Criminal Negligence
Just as forms of civil negligence, particularly aggravated
negligence, are often nebulous and poorly defined, vari-
ous forms of criminal negligence are also difficult to dis-
cern. Few jurisdictions specifically define liability for
negligent homicide. Instead, states often punish negli-
gent homicide as a form of manslaughter.' 0 1 Some juris-
97 Ferguson v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 678 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1982).
9, In addition to mistaking one airport for another, the pilot failed to use navi-
gational aids available to him. Id. at 824-25, 829. The-term "reckless", for FAR
91.9 purposes means conduct demonstrating " 'a gross disregard for safety when cou-
pled with the creation of actual danger to life and property' ", the court wrote. Id.
at 829 (quoting Administrator v. Understein, NTSB Order EA-1644 (1981) (em-
phasis added)).
Ferguson, 678 F.2d at 823-24.
See Daily v. Bond, 623 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1980). In Daily, a plane caught fire
after the pilot tried to start it, knowing that the generator had been removed and
that certain wires were loose. The court said that there was adequate proof of
negligence, and that a prudent pilot would have known that fire could develop.
Id. at 626. This was arguably ordinary negligence but the pilot was penalized for a
violation of the careless and reckless rule. Id.
10, See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.07 (West 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.005
(Vernon 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.3 (1974).
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dictions define negligent homicide as conduct committed
"without due caution or circumspection of a lawful act
which might produce death."'' 0 2 Other states merely use
the terms culpable negligence or criminal negligence
without attempting to further define them. 0 3 A few other
states prescribe by statute their own unique definitions of
the culpability that will support a finding of criminally
negligent behavior. °4
Case law has been only slightly more successful than
statutory efforts in satisfactorily describing negligent
homicide. Typically, courts describe negligent homicide
in any of three ways. They may define negligent homicide
by using cliches, 0 5 by focusing on some objective stan-
dard to determine culpability,10 6 or by focusing on the
subjective perception of the defendant.'0 7
It is instructive to look at the Model Penal Code for the
drafters' approach in setting standards for criminal negli-
102 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1979). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 192.2 (West Supp.
1984).
103 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 265, § 13 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 27.533 (West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-18 (1981).
104 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.12 (West 1974) ("Criminal negligence ex-
ists when, although neither specific nor general criminal intent is present, there is
such disregard of the interest of others that the offender's conduct amounts to a
gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reason-
ably careful man under like circumstances."); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.06(2) (West
1982) ("Reckless conduct consists of an act which creates a situation of unreason-
able risk and high probability of death or great bodily harm to another and which
demonstrates a conscious disregard for the safety of another and a willingness to
take known chances of perpetuating an injury.").
105 State v. Hamilton, 149 Me. 218, 239, 100 A.2d 234, 244 (1953) ("reckless
disregard for life and safety of others"); People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 198, 148
N.W. 400, 406 (1914) ("wanton and reckless disregard in indifference to safety of
others"); State v. Adams, 359 Mo. 845, 851, 224 S.W.2d 54, 57 (1949) ("such
reckless character as to indicate an utter indifference for human life").
101 Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 398, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (1944)
(defendant held to have knowledge of facts that a reasonable man would have
known); Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 347, 164 A.2d 467, 469 (1960) (wanton or
reckless disregard for human life such that the defendant did not foresee victim's
death when a reasonable person would have).
,07 State v. Spann, 289 Minn. 497, 499, 182 N.W.2d 873, 874 (1970) (aggra-
vated negligence required for conviction demands conscious creation by the de-
fendant of an unreasonable risk); Accord State v. Wickstrom, 14 Wis. 2d 416, 424,
111 N.W.2d 176 (1961).
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gence. °8 The Code rejects any subjective standard for
determining criminal negligence. Instead, subjectivity is
considered under the definition of recklessness when de-
fining the separate and more serious crime of manslaugh-
ter.10 9 Some would argue that a subjective notion of
culpability is required for all forms of criminal responsi-
bility. The drafters of the Code urge, however, that a sub-
stantial degree of fault must be shown, even to find
negligent homicide; the state must show a "gross devia-
tion from ordinary standards of conduct." ' 0
Another view, adopted by several states, is to draw a
distinction between negligent homicide (including vehicu-
lar homicide) and reckless homicide (manslaughter).'
This standard, found in a number of modern codes,
would mean that negligent homicide occurs when the ac-
tor creates an unreasonable risk of which he was not
aware, but should have been," 12 and manslaughter occurs
when an actor creates an unreasonable risk of harm, but
,os MODEL PENAL CODE §210.4 ("Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homi-
cide when it is committed negligently.").
-9 Id. at 210.3. (recklessness defined as a "conscious disregard of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that will be caused by the actor's conduct"). Id. at
§ 2.02.(2)(c).
11o Id. at § 210.4, comment at 85-87.
II See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:31, 14:32 (West 1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.15 (McKinney 1975). Some states treat negligent homicide as a form of
manslaughter. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.07 (West 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. fit.
18, § 2504 (Purdon 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 32.070 (1977).
1.2 See, e.g., the Texas Penal Code, which defines the offense of criminally negli-
gent homicide (§ 1907 (Vernon 1974)), and defines criminal negligence as
follows:
A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent,
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result
of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjus-
tifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive
it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an or-
dinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's viewpoint.
TEX. PENAL CODE §6.03(d) (Vernon 1974). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.10,





In light of the confusion and uncertainty evidenced by
the reported cases, it is necessary that some standard be
adopted by which any person, including an aviator, who
unintentionally causes the death of another, can be
judged. Moreover, that behavior which starts out as negli-
gence in the sky should not be converted to recklessness
by the time it is considered in court.
The author disagrees with the Model Penal Code, which
disregards the defendant's state of mind when defining
criminal negligence. Before criminalizing negligent con-
duct, society should be able to point to some mens rea.
Whatever theory of criminal justice one subscribes to, the
standards applied should enable the trier of fact to focus
on the conduct which is to be criminalized. Furthermore,
given the fact that our criminal courts are presently un-
able to process "criminals" due to congestion, some re-
straint must be exercised in criminalizing and prosecuting
what may be more appropriately handled in civil courts.
The author proposes that two elements must be present
before an aviator can be held criminally responsible for
the unintentional death of another: 1) a reckless state of
mind exhibiting a conscious disregard for the safety of
others (subjective), and 2) the creation of an unreasona-
ble risk of grievous bodily harm (objective). An objective
test alone, wherein the proverbial reasonable man is
asked to assess conduct in terms of whether it creates an
unreasonable risk of harm, is particularly susceptible to
abuse in aviation cases. Many people (potential jurors)
still consider flying to be an extradangerous activity by
comparison to driving. This leads to unfairness because
the criminal negligence law which has developed, and the
jury instructions derived therefrom, have come from driv-
1' C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 168 (14th ed. 1979). See also People
v. Cruciana, 70 Misc. 2d 528, 334 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1972).
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ing accidents which are not always a good metaphor with
aviation accidents.
With regard to the subjective test, the fact that an actor
should have been aware of the consequences of his con-
duct should not alone, it is submitted, subject him to
criminal liability for negligent homicide. Criminal prose-
cution may have some deterrent effect in preventing pilots
from consciously creating unreasonable risks of grievous
bodily harm, but will have little or no utilitarian value in
preventing the inadvertent creation of an unreasonable
risk of the same harm.
Finally, there is the moral argument that our society
tends to measure personal accountability in terms of an
individual's willingness to consciously violate clearly es-
tablished societal norms. If the individual does not sub-
jectively perceive these serious risks due to his
inadvertence, he has not descended to the moral level of
one who consciously runs a serious risk despite society's
norms.
IV. CROSS-OVER PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL-CIVIL-
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION
The practitioner representing an aviation client will
likely find his client under attack on several levels, all of
which may demand concurrent consideration. These may
include civil litigation, criminal prosecution, and adminis-
trative proceedings. Activity in each area will likely con-
tinue to some degree regardless of the status of the
others. Five areas of concern should take on special im-
portance to persons involved in such multi-faceted litiga-
tion: investigations, discovery problems, evidentiary es-
toppel, collateral estoppel, and insurance considerations.
1. Investigations
The first evidence-gathering activity after a serious air-
plane accident is the Field Investigation." 4 The powers
14 See 14 C.F.R. § 831.10 (1984).
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
of a Field Investigator and the scope of his investigation
are broad." 5 Much of the essential testimonial, documen-
tary, and tangible evidence will already have been uncov-
ered by the Field Investigator before litigation
commences. Investigations of serious accidents almost al-
ways result in a report replete with factual findings, tech-
nical data, statements, and expert analyses." 6
Compared to medical malpractice, toxic tort, products
liability, or commercial litigation, aviation accident litiga-
tion is unique in that an independent government body of
experts conducts an investigation of almost every serious
accident in the aviation industry." 7 Accordingly, civil liti-
gants, administrative enforcement officials, and criminal
prosecutors are quick to use such reports as a template or
substitute for case preparation. Additionally, if admitted
into evidence, the factual findings and expert analysis
contained in a report will have greater than normal per-
suasive value in any type of proceeding.
The NTSB investigates aviation accidents and records
its findings in a computer format entitled "Briefs of Acci-
dents", which breaks down the investigator's analysis into
probable causes and factors." 8 The NTSB also maintains
in its public docket section a "Factual Report" for each
accident." 9 The Factual Report contains data, state-
ments, diagrams, and investigator analyses and opinions.
Opinions as to the probable cause of an accident are not a
part of the Factual Report, however. It is the material in
this docket that many courts allow into evidence, whether
it be factual material, analysis, or opinion, as long as the
probable cause determination is not revealed. 20 Courts
seldom admit Briefs of Accidents into evidence, however,
since they contain opinion about the cause of an accident.
For major accidents, the determination by the NTSB of
1- See 49 C.F.R. §§ 831.1-831.12 (1984).
,1 See 49 C.F.R. § 801.35 (1984).
117 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1982); 49 C.F.R. § 831.1 (1984).
- 49 C.F.R. § 801.35(a) (1984).
19 49 C.F.R. §§ 831.30, 801.31 (1984).
120 See infra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
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probable cause and its report of facts are contained in a
narrative known as a "Blue Cover" report.12' Those por-
tions of the "Blue Cover" report not inextricably in-
terwined with the probable cause determination found
therein may also be admissible evidence. A great deal of
factual data within NTSB reports has frequently been held
admissible where not otherwise excluded by the rules of
evidence.122 Such information may include weather data,
traffic patterns and runway information, pilot biographies,
wreckage descriptions, "black box" data, log book entries,
and photographs.
Evaluative and analytical documents based on factual
data but involving some processing and application of ex-
pertise by the investigator and his staff lie in the gray area
between factual data and opinion. Examples of such ana-
lytical documents may include flight or ground-track dia-
grams, altitude profiles, wreckage layout charts, pilot
flight time summaries, and weather summaries. For the
most part, these documents have been admitted into evi-
dence 1 3 under one of the exceptions to the hearsay
rule 24 because of the neutral and trustworthy status and
21 49 C.F.R. § 801.35(b) (1984). "Blue Cover" report is a term used by lawyers
and government officials who work in this area of the law.
122 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 816 (4th Cir. 1982) (trial court
admission of factual portion of NTSB report but refusal to permit use of NTSB
conclusions was proper.); Benna v. Resser Flying Service, Inc., 578 F.2d 269
(9th Cir. 1978) (allowing jury to view NTSB report was erroneous violation of 49
U.S.C. § 1441 (e), but error not prejudicial because report contained only cumula-
tive factual data and not official Board conclusion on probable cause); American
Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 195-96 (5th Cir. 1969) (factual data
upon which NTSB based probable cause opinion not admissible); Berguido v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963) (factual data in NTSB report is
admissible only if otherwise admissible pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence);
Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Frank, 227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn. 1964) (factual testi-
mony by NTSB investigators admissible); Todd v. Weikle, 36 Md. App. 663, 376
A.2d 104 (1977) (factual portion of NTSB report admissible; only the opinions
regarding cause of accident not admissible).
12, E.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Harvey, 558 P.2d 879, 882-83 (Alaska 1976)
(all investigator analyses and opinions are admissible except those going to ulti-
mate determination of probable cause determined by Board as expressed in
Board report). Accord American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 196
(5th Cir. 1969).
124 FED. R. EvID. 803(6), 803(8), 803(24).
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expert capabilities of the investigator.
Even outright opinions of NTSB investigators have
been admitted into evidence when they have not included
opinions as to the ultimate issue of probable cause, and
where exclusion of such opinions was not otherwise re-
quired by the evidence rules. 25 Such opinions may in-
clude the opinion as to whether a pilot was qualified for
the flight, whether he complied with good operating prac-
tices, and whether the position of levers in the cockpit or
needles on the instruments retrieved from wreckage were
indicative of their pre-impact status.
At least one court allowed a NTSB investigator to tes-
tify to statements made by parties to the investigation or
their employees. 126 Although that ruling permitted the
investigator to become a conduit for hearsay, it finds sup-
port in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which allow an ex-
pert to give hearsay testimony if it is the type of
information reasonably relied on by experts in his field. 127
Indeed, since it is the modus operandi for NTSB investiga-
tors to rely on statements by technical people and eyewit-
nesses, investigators can arguably testify about
information received from all of their sources so long as
they do not usurp the prerogatives of the court by stating
their ultimate opinions as to probable cause. If permitted,
this could lead to the admission of the entire Factual Re-
125 Murphy v. Colorado Aviation, Inc., 41 Colo. App. 237, 588 P.2d 877, 881-82
(1978) (NTSB investigator was properly allowed to give his opinions based upon
factual data in the NTSB report when his testimony, though leading to such a
conclusion, did not state that the accident was caused by pilot negligence). See
Kline v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31, 32-33 (E.D. Va. 1972) (Investigator opinions
may be inquired into during deposition so long as they do not embrace the ulti-
mate cause of the accident).
126 Swett v. Schenk, 18 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,106 (L.A. Super. Ct. March 31,
1983). An NTSB investigator may testify as to facts and opinions solicited from
parties to an aircraft accident investigation, who are parties of litigation, or em-
ployees of party defendants and who are acting in the course and scope of their
employment, so long as the testimony does not involve the opinion of the Board
or of the investigator as to the ultimate cause of the accident involved. Id. State-
ments made to an investigator do not become privileged, nor can an investigator
confer the cloak of his privilege to party defendants or their employees. Id.
127 FED. R. EvID. 703.
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port and everything in the Blue Cover report except the
ultimate opinion as to probable cause.
In addition to the NTSB, the FAA regularly investi-
gates aviation accidents. Indeed, various federal agencies
such as the FBI, 128 Forestry Service,1 2 9 Coast Guard, 130
Army,'13 ' Navy,'1 2 Air Force, ,33 Army National Guard, 13 4
Air Force National Guard,' National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),' 1 6 Department of
Agriculture, 137 and NASA 38 frequently have occasion to
conduct aircrash accident investigations. State agencies
and associations, and various state and local law enforce-
ment officers also perform investigations as a result of
aircraft accidents. With the exception of the military,
which prohibits the release of their "safety" reports, and
the F.B.I., which restricts the release of their "confiden-
tial" reports, the various government agency reports will
generally be admissible if they satisfy the rules of
evidence. 39
Counsel involved in multi-faceted litigation cannot al-
ways anticipate where an investigative report will have its
greatest impact. It would be a mistake, however, to fail to
anticipate the use and admissiblility of NTSB reports in
complex litigation. Accordingly, counsel for parties to
aviation accident litigation should use all legitimate and
ethical means to prepare their clients and those witnesses
within their clients' sphere of influence before interroga-
tion by investigators and testimony before the NTSB or
other government agencies. 140
128 See 49 U.S.C. § 1472(o)(1983).
129 See 16 U.S.C. § 553 (1978).
13o See 14 U.S.C. § 93 (1983).
- See 10 U.S.C. § 93 (1979).
,32 See 32 C.F.R. § 766.5(i)(3) (1984).
- See 32 C.F.R. § 809a.5(a) (1984).
134 See 10 U.S.C. § 3078 (1979).
135 See 10 U.S.C. § 3078 (1985).
,3c See 33 U.S.C. § 857.14(c) (1985).
1-7 See 7 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1985).
,58 See 14 C.F.R. § 1204.1406(b) (1985).
,39 FED. R. EvID. 802(8).
,4o 49 C.F.R. § 831.6 (1984) provides:
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2. Unique Discovery in Mixed Criminal-Civil Litigation
When overlapping litigation arises from an incident,
counsel representing any involved party should be aware
of the unique opportunities and problems that will be en-
countered. For example, counsel may uncover informa-
tion during the discovery phase of an administrative
proceeding that will have great impact on the criminal
prosecution of his client. An examination of some of
those opportunites and problems is appropriate at this
point.
In most jurisdictions, civil discovery is very broad.' 41
Discovery by a criminal defendant is broader in scope
than that granted to the prosecutor, but not as liberal as
that enjoyed by parties to civil litigation. 42 A civil litigant
facing criminal prosecution may want to prepare his inter-
rogatories and requests for production with an eye to-
wards his defense of the criminal charges. Many
jurisdictions either deny a criminal defendant the right to
take depositions or grant criminal defendants the right to
take depositions only for purposes of preserving testi-
mony and not for discovery. 41 Thus, counsel for a crimi-
nal defendant who is also involved in civil litigation, may
be able legitimately to notice the discovery deposition of
important witnesses in the civil case in the hope of discov-
ering valuable information for the defense of the criminal
case. 14 4 The discovery deposition testimony taken and
documents produced may be admitted as substantive evi-
Any person interrogated by an authorized representative of the
Board during the field investigation, shall be accorded the right to
be accompanied, represented, or advised by counsel or by any other
duly qualified representative.
141 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
142 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 33, 34, 36, with FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, 17.
143 See People v. Municipal Court, 20 Cal. 3d 523, 574 P.2d 425, 143 Cal. Rptr.
609, 613-14 (1978). Cf FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a), 17(0.
,4 A caveat to the availability of this tactic is the potential situation where a
deponent who is also an "accused" or a potential accused may assert the fifth
amendment rather than answer many of the questions that may be put to him.
Faced with this obstruction, a civil litigant may try to seek an immunity order com-
pelling the witness to testify so long as his constitutional rights are protected. See
Daly v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 132, 560 P.2d 1193, 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1977).
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dence in other proceedings 4 ' or at least used for im-
peachment purposes. 146
Since criminal, civil, and administrative litigation have
different procedural rules, burdens of proof, discovery
timetables, etc., generalized advice cannot be given on the
timing of discovery. However, certain aspects of practice
in a uni-dimensional case take on greater importance in
multi-faceted aviation litigation, regardless of the order in
which litigation proceeds. For example, because impor-
tant percipient witnesses will normally be interviewed by
parties to all proceedings, the "early bird may catch the
worm" in the sense of gaining early cooperation from the
witness. This is particularly true where the early bird is a
prosecutor. Witnesses in awe or fear of the powers of a
prosecutor can be amazingly reticent after meeting with
him. Although a witness can refuse to talk with the de-
fense 4 7 unless he has been subpoenaed, the prosecution
cannot order witnesses to refrain from talking with de-
fense counsel. 48 Imagine, too, a witness' reluctance to
repeat testimony as the number of would be interviewers
increases.
Another issue which should be considered in multi-fac-
eted litigation is whether it is desirable to permit the civil
or administrative case to proceed while criminal prosecu-
tion is in progress. 149 Where criminal prosecution has be-
gun, even as early as the grand jury investigation, counsel
may be able to obtain a stay of civil litigation and adminis-
trative enforcement proceedings pending the outcome of
145 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
46 FED. R. EvID. 613.
17 People v. Bowen, 22 Cal. App. 3d 267, 278-81, 99 Cal. Rptr. 498, 504-06
(Cal. Ct. App.1972).
148 Schnidler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 513, 327 P.2d 68, 73-74 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1958), overruled sub nom. on other grounds, People v. Garner, 367 P.2d
680, 684, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 44 (1961); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d
134, 317 P.2d 130, 134 (1959).
"4 See, e.g., United States v. Amrep Corp., 405 F.Supp. 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
where the district court granted a criminal defendant's motion for a stay of civil
proceedings until after entry of a verdict in the criminal trial.
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criminal prosecution.1 50  Although different sovereigns
may have the right to hear civil, administrative, and crimi-
nal matters concurrently, it would be unfair to do so in
many cases. For example, a suspect may refuse to answer
pointed questions in civil discovery for fear of incrimina-
tion. '5 Also, a stay may be appropriate when prosecutors
and law enforcement officials have subpoenaed tangible
and documentary evidence for their exclusive use in pros-
ecution. Similarly, it may be argued that a party should
not be forced to reveal defenses in a civil proceeding that
will be critical to his criminal defense. 5 2
If a stay of civil discovery cannot be obtained, counsel
should seek an order granting access to the evidence in
the hands of the prosecutor, or protecting against de-
structive testing of tangible evidence without the partici-
pation or observation of experts. Similarly, if depositions
are ongoing in a related action before a different sover-
eign, permission to participate may be sought from the
court with jurisdiction over the deposition on the grounds
that involvement will avoid subjecting witnesses to repeti-
tive depositions.
Another problem involves the discoverability of grand
jury testimony that usually is in the form of a transcript.
Since those who appear before a grand jury must do so
without counsel in most jurisdictions, 53 it is unlikely that
15o United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
15, See infra notes 152-182 and accompanying text.
152 See United States v. Simon, 262 F.Supp. 64, 73-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 373
F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967) (criminal defendants who desired to assert fifith amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination entitled to enjoin civil litigant opponent
from taking their depositions pending trial of criminal actions).
153 See, e.g., FED R. CRIM. P. 6(d), which provides an exclusive list of persons
who may be present while a federal grand jury is in session - the only attorneys
who may be present are government attorneys. Several states have followed a
recent and controversial trend to allow witnesses who are targets of grand jury
investigations to be assisted by counsel in the grand jury room, and at least one
state allows such counsel to make objections on the clients' behalf. W. LAFAVE &
J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8:13(b) (1984) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE &
ISRAEL].
Since no criminal proceedings have yet commenced against a person at the
grand jury investigation level, the sixth amendment right to counsel is not impli-
cated. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). Accordingly, except where allowed
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their testimony could ever be introduced as substantive
evidence against them, although it could be used for im-
peachment.1 54 Witnesses whom an attorney may wish to
call on behalf of his client in subsequent civil proceedings
should be advised of the ultimate potential use of their
grand jury testimony if it is discoverable. In some juris-
dictions, a transcript of grand jury proceedings is pro-
tected from disclosure unless a showing can be made that
the disclosure is necessary to prevent injustices in a civil
action.' 55 In jurisdictions that allow the disclosure of
grand jury transcripts, 56 such transcripts should be ob-
tained as part of the discovery practice.
3. Evidentiary Estoppel
Just as one can be collaterally estopped as a matter of
law from trying certain issues already litigated in a prior
proceeding, evidence adduced in one proceeding can
have the practical effect of estopping a party from effec-
tively or persuasively offering evidence in a later proceed-
ing. Such a situation can be described as "evidentiary
estoppel", that is, a party may be effectively prevented
from introducing contrary evidence in a later proceeding
in much the same manner as a prior inconsistent state-
ment may effectively prevent him from making a contrary
statement in a subsequent proceeding. Moreover, rules
of evidence may operate to estop an aviator from denying
that persuasive - and sometimes conclusive - evidence has
been admitted in prior criminal or administrative
proceedings.
by statute, a witness may not insist upon the presence of his attorney in the grand
jury room. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
,54 E.g., FED. R. EvIn. 613.
15- Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops, Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1).
I. Approximately one third of the jurisdictions allow disclosures of grand jury
testimony along with the prosecution witness' recorded statements; one-third of
the jurisdictions give the court authority to grant disclosure with a showing of
"particularized need"; and the other third, which refuse to disclose prior recorded
prosecution witness' statements, also refuse to disclose grand jury transcripts.
LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 153, at § 19.3(g) n. 95 (1984).
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Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence codi-
fies a common law rule that generally peirmits the use of
former testimony in a subsequent proceeding as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. 157 As long as all of the require-
ments for use of the former testimony exception are met,
the nature of the proceedings from which the testimony
was obtained is immaterial.' 58 The federal rules deem
former testimony to be reliable, 159 although testimony
from a live, in court witness receives greater
preference. 6 0
Certain requirements must be met before former testi-
mony will be admitted. First, the witness providing the
former testimony must be unavailable to testify in person
in the current proceeding.' 6' Second, the former testi-
mony must have been given in an earlier proceeding. 162
Third, the party against whom the testimony is offered
must have had the opportunity to develop the earlier testi-
mony. 163 Fourth, the party against whom it is offered must
have had a similar motive to develop the testimony. 6 4
' E. CLEARY & C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 759-60 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as CLEARY & MCCORMICK].
I58 Id. at 769.
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 804(b)(1)[01] (1979).
160 FED. R. EVID. 804(b) advisory committee note.
.61 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). The witness is unavailable if he is exempted by the
court because a privilege is asserted, if he refuses to testify despite a court order,
if he testifies to a lack of memory concerning the subject matter, if he has died or
is physically or mentally unable, or if the proponent of the evidence is unable to
secure his presence in court. Id. at 804(a)(1)-(5). The prosecution in a criminal
proceeding may introduce the former testimony of an unavailable witness only if
the prosecution has made a good faith effort to secure the attendance of such
witness at trial. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
162 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Testimony is considered to be a statement that is
sworn, subject to penalty of perjury, on the record, and pursuant to legally au-
thorized routine. D. LouISELL & C. MILLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 487 (1980)
(hereinafter cited as LoUISELL AND MILLER) Broadly stated, a proceeding is a pre-
vious trial, administrative hearing, deposition, preliminary hearing, or grand jury
inquest. Id.
13 Id. See also J. MOORE, 11 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 804.04[2] (1976)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
-' FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). See also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. at 725 (1968); 11
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 804.04[3] (1976). Even though the ultimate issue
may be different in the preceding matter, the motive to address a particular issue
may be evident and the defendant will be held to have had the opportunity to
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In criminal cases, an additional element requires the
former testimony to have been originally offered against
the defendant against whom it is later offered. 165 The de-
fendant must also have had an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the witness. 166 Testimony admitted in a criminal
proceeding can be used in a subsequent civil proceed-
ing,' 67 and, although the occurrence would be a rare one,
testimony from a civil action can be used in a later crimi-
nal proceeding. 68 Testimony offered before administra-
tive bodies such as the NTSB can also be admitted in
subsequent litigation.' 69  The exception to the hearsay
rule has even been applied so as to allow the admission in
an American court of testimony given before an adminis-
trative agency of a foreign government. 70
4. Collateral Estoppel
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, an issue
which has been actually litigated before a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by the same parties
or their privies.171 The doctrine of collateral estoppel ap-
plies in both civil and criminal litigation. Collateral estop-
develop the testimony. United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309, 316 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976).
1r5 See United States v. Collins, 478 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1973). See also FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(1).
- LOUISELL & MILLER, supra note 162, at § 487. See also Government of the
Canal Zone v. Yanez P. (Pinto), 590 F.2d 1344, 1353, 1355 (5th Cir. 1979).
167 Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 560 F. Supp. 495, 498-501
(D. Del. 1983); Carpenter v. Dizio, 506 F. Supp. 1117, 1123-24 (E.D. Pa.),affld,
673 F.2d 1298 (1981); Bryant v. Trinity Univ. Ins. Co. 411 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.
Civ. App.- Dallas 1967, writ refd n.r.e.).
-1 See United States v. Vecchiarello, 569 F.2d 656, 663-65 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
169 E.g., Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580 F.2d 1179, 1184-87 (3d. Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978); Gilliam v. Omaha, 524 F.2d 1013, 1016 n.4 (8th Cir.
1975); Tug Raven v. Trexler, 419 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
939 (1969).
o70 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1299
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd in part and rev d in part on other grounds, 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983)
(hearings before Japanese Fair Trade Commission later admitted in private anti-
trust action).
'1' 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4416 (1981).
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pel may be used defensively 72 (employed by a defendant
against a plaintiff who lost an issue in an earlier case), or
offensively 73 (employed by a plaintiff against a defendant
who earlier lost the issue), and can be asserted in many
instances by a litigant who was not a party to the earlier
litigation. 74 Obviously, the ability to estop an opponent
from contesting an issue or factual allegation is a great
advantage. An attorney facing multi-faceted litigation
must be careful to vigorously litigate issues that are of mi-
nor significance in one proceeding, but which could be of
major import in a later proceeding. The importance of
giving careful consideration to potential collateral estop-
pel situations becomes apparent when viewed in light of
the courts' increasing willingness to permit the use of col-
lateral estoppel. 75 The courts recognize the substantial
reduction in their workloads when parties cannot reliti-
gate issues already decided.1 76
In order for a litigant to collaterally estop another party
from relitigating an issue, the issue must be the same as
that litigated in the prior action, the issue must have been
actually litigated, there must have been a valid and final
judgment, and the issue must have been essential to the
prior judgment. 177 Historically, courts required mutual-
ity of parties (or their privies) as a condition precedent to
the application of collateral estoppel. 78 Parties not in-
volved in the litigation of the initial action could not rely
on the issues determined in that action in subsequent pro-
ceedings. However, that requirement has been re-
172 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971).
173 Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
'74 Id. at 327-28.
17- See Thau, Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability of Criminal Determinations: Theoret-
ical, Practical and Strategic Implication for Criminal and Civil Litigation, 70 GEo. L.J.
1079, 1079-80 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Thau].
176 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 327.
177 Haize v. Hanover Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 576, 579 (3rd Cir. 1976). See also Thau,
supra note 175, at 1082.
178 IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.441 [3.-2] (2d ed. 1983).
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jected.179  The abandonment of the mutuality require-
ment has not only made it easier to use collateral estoppel
generally, it has made it easier to apply the findings from
one kind of proceeding (e.g., civil, criminal, administra-
tive) to another.180
Generally, criminal matters are adjudicated more rap-
idly than civil matters. Attorneys representing aviators
should be wary of the potential collateral estoppel impact
of a criminal conviction - even if only for a misdeameanor
- in related civil litigation. This is particularly true where
a possibility for a substantial adverse civil judgment exists,
or where the single conviction of a corporate agent could
be used against the corporation in separate civil actions.
Ordinarily, the collateral estoppel effect of criminal
court findings is dependent upon an issue having been ac-
tually litigated, and a guilty verdict returned against the
defendant.'t8  Some courts have granted collateral estop-
pel effect to guilty pleas.182 Such a result has been criti-
cized, however, since no issues are actually litigated in a
plea bargain situation. 8 3
There exist many sound policy justifications for collat-
erally estopping a civil litigant from relitigating an issue
which he lost in a criminal trial. Criminal defendants usu-
119 See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971) (mutuality requirement for defensive collateral estoppel aban-
doned); Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (mutuality require-
ment for offensive collateral estoppel abandoned).
180 Since a criminal action involves the state as the prosecuting "plaintiff," abo-
lition of the mutuality rule allows private parties to benefit from determinations of
the criminal court by simply waiting for the state to prove its case.
,8 Thau, supra note 175, at 1109-1111.
182 See Nathan v. Terma Corp. 560 F.2d 761, 763-64 (7th Cir. 1977); Brazzel v.
Adams, 493 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1974); Cumberland Pharmacy v. Blum, 69 A.D.2d
903, 415, N.Y.S. 2d 898, 900 (1979).
,83 See Thau, supra note 175, at 1109-111. See also Proise v. Haring, 667 F.2d
1133, 1140-41 (4th Cir. 1981), afd, 462 U.S. 306 (1983). Similarly, convictions of
"lesser offenses" may be unreliable because they are not fiercely litigated. See
Gilbert v. Barieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 423 N.E.2d 807, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1981). Of
course, a criminal defendant could plead nolo contendere in the criminal action and
be assured that there will be no collateral estoppel effect since such a plea is inad-
missible in subsequent actions. FED. R. EvID. 410(2); CLEARY & MCCORMICK,
supra note 157, at 783.
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ally receive greater procedural safeguards than do civil lit-
igants.' 84 A prosecutor must prove his case beyond a
reasonable doubt, not just by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Criminal defendants are afforded one appeal as a
matter of right. Criminal defendants also enjoy an advan-
tage in discovery: prosecutors ordinarily must turn over
most of the evidence they have upon request by the
defendant. 85
The application of administrative findings to civil ac-
tions has also been firmly accepted.' 86 The same restric-
tions in the use of collateral estoppel from one court to
another apply with equal force to the use of administrative
findings in civil proceedings. 87 However, the collateral
estoppel effect may not be honored where a party subject
to the administrative procedure did not have an incentive
to vigorously litigate the matter before the administrative
agency. 188
Some commentators argue that the granting of collat-
eral estoppel effect to administrative findings in civil mat-
ters should be severely restricted or disallowed. 8 9 They
argue that permitting the use of administrative determina-
tions in civil actions may have the effect of shifting the
burden of proof for some issues to the defendant, who
normally would not be saddled with that burden.' 90 Civil
184 Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 607, 375 P.2d
439, 441, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 562 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 966 (1963).
185 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
186 United States v. Utah Const. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 411 (1966).
,87 See, e.g., Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1170 (5th Cir. 1981).
-8 See Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d at 1168; Bowen v. United States, 570
F.2d 1311, 1322 (7th Cir. 1978).
,89 Maines, Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Mass Tort or Products Liability Cases: The
Potential for Corporate Catastrophe From Prior Administrative Proceedings, 27 TRIAL LAW
GUIDE 175 (1983); Perschbucker, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive
Effect of Administrative Determination in Judicial Proceedings, 35 FLA. L. REV. 442
(1983).
- Maines, supra note 189, at 179. Maines suggests that in many administrative
proceedings, the burden of proof is effectively on the defendant, vis-a-vis the
agency. Failure of the defendant to prove his case before the agency may give a
later civil litigant grounds to seek collateral estoppel effect. If a plaintiff in a civil
action who would ordinarily have the burden is allowed collateral estoppel on the
issue, the burden of proof has effectively shifted.
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litigants seeking to use collateral estoppel against a party
who was unsuccessful in an administrative matter may
also benefit from the lower standards of proof that apply
in many administrative proceedings,1 91 as well as from
looser evidenciary standards. Moreover, administrative
litigants may have less opportunity to compel discovery
than their counterparts in civil litigation 92 and overall
procedural changes may create unfairness to a party, mak-
ing it unfair to apply collateral estoppel.193
The collateral estoppel effect of an administrative pro-
ceeding in the aviation context was most notably applied
in Bowen v. United States.' 94 In that case, a private pilot
brought suit against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for the alleged negligence of government
air traffic controllers. The plaintiff alleged that air traffic
controllers had failed to warn him of the icing conditions
that ultimately caused him to crash in Indiana. In an ear-
lier NTSB proceeding, that agency found that the plaintiff
had violated FAR 91.9 (careless or reckless operation of
an aircraft) and had failed to live up to his pilot responsi-
bilities under FAR 91.3(a),' 95 by entering clouds when
there was a known possibility of icing in an aircraft not
equipped for in-flight icing. ' 96 Although no Indiana deci-
sions existed on the application of administrative agency
findings to civil actions, the Bowen court examined the pol-
icy and history of the collateral estoppel effects of admin-
istrative findings and determined that Indiana courts
would have permitted collateral estoppel to attach to the
19, North Carolina v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 537 F.2d 67, 74 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 870 (1976); Finnerman v. McCormick, 499 F.2d 212, 215 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
'9 Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.
1977); United States v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
ul, United States v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (E.D. Mich. 1975),
afd in part and remanded in part, 577 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 616 F.2d
895 (6th Cir. 1980).
11,4 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
' ' 5 Federal Aviation Regulation 91.3(a), 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1980) provides
that "[t]he pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the
final authority to, the operation of that aircraft".
,w; Bowen, 570 F.2d at 1314, 1323.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
NTSB findings." 7 The United States successfully as-
serted the contributory negligence of the pilot as a bar to
recovery. 9 8
5. Insurance Considerations
Aviation counsel involved in litigation with insured par-
ties, as well as those who represent the insured, should be
aware of insurance considerations that might affect cover-
age in cases of aggravated negligence and potential crimi-
nal liability. Generally, there is a strong public policy
against insuring against intentional criminal acts,' 9 9 but
this policy does not apply to indemnification of innocent
employers for the unauthorized illegal acts of employ-
ees.2 0 0 Additionally, the policy against insuring against
criminal acts may be circumvented when an innocent third
party sustains injury.20 ' In keeping with this public policy,
insurers often include in their policies an "unlawful pur-
pose" exclusion which purports to allow an insurer to es-
cape coverage when an aircraft is used for unlawful
purposes. Courts have generally recognized these excep-
tions and allowed the denial of coverage for the clearly
unlawful use of airplanes.
To be distinguished from the "unlawful purpose" ex-
ception, many aviation policies have an exclusion for vio-
lation of specific federal air regulations. Coverage has
successfully been avoided when insurance policy provi-
sions were written narrowly and unambiguiguously, and
disclaimed coverage for the results of violations of speci-
fied regulations. On the other hand, courts have gener-
ally refused to allow insurers to escape payment of
197 See id. at 1313, 1322.
'9 Id. at 1323.
Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 1105, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 285 (1978); Herrman v. Folkerts, 202 Kans. 116, 446 P.2d 834, 837 (1968);
Kangas v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 64 Mich. App. 1, 235 N.W.2d 42, 45 (1975).
2WO Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Richard, 273 F. Supp 952, 953 (D.C. Fla.
1967) (coverage of punitive damages for employee's illegal act); Farris v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 273 Or. 628, 542 P.2d 1031, 1035 (1975).
201 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Security Ins. Group, 292 Ala. 27, 288 So. 2d 134, 136
(1973).
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benefits by invoking the "unlawful purpose" exception -
generally applicable to criminal acts - when a pilot may
merely have been in violation of a federal aviation
regulation.
Insurance policy terms disclaiming coverage for inten-
tional illegal acts have not allowed insurers to escape cov-
erage for acts committed through gross negligence. 2
Individual policies usually do not exclude gross negli-
gence from coverage, but instead impliedly provide cover-
age since the language is typically couched in terms of
covering "occurrences" without conditions such as the
degree of negligence involved." Thus, payment of bene-
fits will generally be required where the policy insures
against accidents - even if it results from aggravated
negligence.20 4
Circumstances may create situations where courts want
to permit coverage, such as when an act was willful, but
the resulting injury was not,20 5 or when no intent to injure
existed, even though the act was wanton or willful.20 6
Even when a court deems conduct to be willful and wan-
ton, coverage may be afforded as long as the conduct was
not intentional.0 7 Cases involving intoxication have been
2 See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1974).
2 See Annot., 2 A.L.R. 3d 1238, 1240 (1965). See also Lloyd's Aircraft Hull
Policy (U.S.A.), standard form policy "Av. 16, exclusion e"; Lloyd's Aircraft Lia-
bility Policy (U.S.A.) standard form policy "Av. 20, exclusion 3" (specific exclu-
sions only made for coverage where aircraft is used for unlawful purposes). But see
Pennsylvania Threshermans & Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCall, 102 Ga. App.
137, 115 S.E. 2d 740, 743 (1960).
204 See American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257, 261 (D. Conn. 1965) (no
policy coverage for intentionally inflicted injuries, but where minor threw bottle
without intent to injure, policy covered resulting injuries); Orkin Exterminating v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 400 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 416 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. 1965).
205 Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Kottmeier, 323 So. 2d 605, 607
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 358, 329
N.E.2d 172, 175, 368 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1975).
206 Escobedo v. Travelers Ins. Co., 227 Cal. App. 2d 353, 38 Cal. Rptr. 645, 649
(Cal. Dt. Ct. App. 1964). But see Auto Club v. Kennison, 549 S.W. 2d 587, 591
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (intent inferred from the circumstances).
207 E.g., Northwestern Nat'l. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962);
General Cas. Co. v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452, 452-58 (6th Cir. 1956); Crull v. Gleb,
382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
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less consistent, however, and frequently turn upon the
courts' construction of the language of each policy.20 8
Finally, the issue of punitive damages arises in cases in-
volving exposure to risk due to greater than ordinary neg-
ligence. This issue is beyond the scope of this article,
however. Other commentators have treated this matter
thoroughly, and have found that slightly more than half of
the jurisdictions do not recognize insurance coverage for
punitive damages.2 °9
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
1. The Self-Incrimination Dilemma
The most difficult constitutional issues that arise early
in mixed civil-criminal litigation involve entitlement to
Miranda warnings 210 and the assertion of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. 21 ' The Miranda
warnings are required when a person is in police custody
or "deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any sig-
nificant way" and the civil or criminal investigation in
which he is involved may result in criminal prosecution. 1 2
The privilege applies in any proceeding wherein the gov-
ernment tries to compel testimony. 21 3
In the aviation context, the need for Miranda warnings
may arise when the FAA investigates alleged violations of
the federal aviation regulations (FARs) or when the NTSB
investigates accidents. The typical witness is unaware of
the morass of federal laws and rules of which his state-
ments unwittingly may reveal a violation. In that the
208 See, e.g., Tison v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 181 So.2d 835, 840 (La. Ct. App.
1965).
209 For an excellent article on the subject, see Kenney, Punitive Damages in Avia-
tion Cases: Solving the Insurance Coverage Dilemma, 48J. AIR. L. & Com. 753 (1983).
210 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
211 "[N]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. This privilege has been imposed on
the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Grif-
fin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
212 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
478).
213 See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
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NTSB and FAA enjoy excellent reputations as the guardi-
ans of aviation safety, the uncounseled interviewee is
tempted to speak freely to an investigator who assures
him that the purpose of the questioning is solely to pre-
vent accidents. These informal verbal assurances, albeit
genuine, may be dismissed as having no legal weight
when other branches of the FAA desire to use the state-
ments in enforcement proceedings, or when the NTSB
statements fall into the hands of zealous prosecutors.
Attempts have been made to establish a requirement
that Miranda warnings be given in investigations leading
to FAA enforcement hearings in which a pilot can lose his
license. The NTSB, however, has a rule that such warn-
ings are unnecessary since they are made in non-custodial
investigations. 21 4 Moreover, in the non-aviation context,
the Supreme Court has held that Miranda rights are not
required in non-custodial civil investigations except in
special situations where the conduct of an official borders
on a custodial interrogation. 2 5 Thus, in the whole spec-
trum of administrative investigations, state and federal
hearings, and grand jury proceedings, a witness does not
enjoy the same protection as a suspect whose apparent
criminality gives rise to police custody. One protection a
witness does have lies in the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. Of course, the efficacy of this right depends upon
whether the person to be questioned is sophisticated
enough to know his rights, or is able to confer with coun-
sel before an interview so that he can judiciously assert his
privilege against self-incrimination.
Although corporations can be convicted of crimes, only
natural persons may claim the privilege.21 6 However,
where a corporation would be criminally liable through its
employees or agents, the claim of privilege by that person
214 E.g., John Ray Gable, 1 N.T.S.B. 654 (1969); Gordon H. Smith, 44 C.A.B.
864 (1966).
2L5 Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-48 (1976).
216 CLEARY & MCCORMICK, supra note 157, at 128.
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217will in most cases protect the corporation.
The privilege applies only to compelled testimonial in-
crimination; a suspect may not refuse to comply with a
subpoena ordering him to produce papers, books, tapes,
and the like which may incriminate him, but which will not
constitute compelled testimony.2 t" A subpoena may not
even be necessary. In order to hold certain licenses, one
must maintain or furnish certain records. 2' 9 For example,
pilot logbooks, airman records, operator certification
data, and an operator's report of accident are potentially
incriminating records which the FAA requires to be cre-
ated, maintained, and made available for inspection.2
Although compliance with these FAA rules is compulsory,
they serve regulatory purposes and are not intended to
compel incrimination. Therefore, the privilege does not
apply. It should be noted, however, that although govern-
mental prosecution, enforcement, and investigative agen-
cies can obtain these records from the FAA and NTSB for
official use, federal law may prevent the disclosure of cer-
tain records to private parties where an unwarranted inva-
sion of privacy would result. 22'
A further factor for consideration is whether the privi-
lege is being asserted on behalf of an "accused" or one
who is merely a "witness." A person becomes an "ac-
cused" when placed in custody, usually a readily discerni-
ble event. If an aviator becomes an "accused" in a
criminal proceeding, his rights are clear. He has the privi-
lege not to testify. If he takes the stand in his defense, he
waives his privilege not to testify. However, it has been
held that in grand jury investigations and in preliminary
hearings, a suspect is not yet an "accused." He may take
217 But see Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957).
218 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472-77 (1976).
219 See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
220 See 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1982); 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.51, 61.59, 121.681-.713,
135.63 (1980).
22, 5 U.S.C. 552(b) (1982). See United States Dep't. of the Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352 (1976).
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the stand, but he cannot be forced to testify.222 A person
who is merely a witness - not yet an accused - may also
claim the freedom from compulsion to disclose self-in-
criminatory matters.22 3 The witness privilege applies in
any judicial, official, investigatory, legislative, or arbitra-
tional proceeding during which persons may be com-
pelled to give testimony or statements.2 24
The privilege to refrain from self-incrimination should
apply to NTSB public hearings where witnesses may be
forced to testify under compulsion of a subpoena. It also
should apply to any FAA enforcement proceeding in
which a certificate holder is required to appear before the
FAA to protect his license or to face certificate action by
the Administrator, and in which revocation of his license
may result.225 Arguably, an NTSB field investigator who
enjoys certain authority to interrogate persons with rele-
vant knowledge of an aircraft accident or incident under
investigation 226 could be met by a refusal to give a state-
ment on the ground that it might tend to be
incriminating.
The risk of incrimination need not be great for a person
to invoke the privilege. 27 The statements need only fur-
nish a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence neces-
sary for conviction.2 28 Indeed, the witness need not
anticipate that his words will be used to incriminate him; it
222 United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 955.
22- Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
22 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 (1967). See generally Heidt, The Conjurer's
Circle: The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062 (1982).
225 The former Assistant General Counsel of the FAA in charge of litigation
wrote, while in office, that:
[A] person may refuse to testify in an FAA investigation if he or she
fears self-incrimination. In that event the hearing officer, with the
approval of the Attorney General, may issue an order requiring testi-
mony. In such instances, however, no information directly or indi-
rectly derived from such testimony may be used against the person
in any criminal case, except for prosecution of perjury.
Pangia, Handling FAA Enforcement Proceedings, 46J. AIR L. & CoM. 573, 581 (1981).
220 See 49 C.F.R. § 831.8 (1984).
227 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950).
228 Id.
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is enough that the statement will lead to incriminating
evidence.229
Failure to assert the privilege in a timely fashion may
result in a waiver of the privilege.2 30 Whether a waiver
exposes a witness to self-incrimination only during the
pending proceeding, or whether the waiver carries over
into an eventual or subsequent trial is open to some dis-
pute.23 ' Thus, a witness has the right to terminate an in-
terview if he fears that by making innocent partial
disclosures he will waive his right to avoid giving poten-
tially incriminating testimony regarding the same incident
in a later proceeding.232
A pilot probably cannot refuse to answer an FAA inves-
tigator's question if he does not expect criminal prosecu-
tion to result, but fears only an enforcement action
against his certificate. The FAA does not have authority
to punish the violation of FARs with criminal sanctions.233
Accordingly, the ultimate sanction of license revocation
may not be sufficiently incriminating to justify the privi-
lege.23 4 An analogous situation exists in disciplinary pro-
ceedings conducted to revoke the license of an attorney.
In such proceedings, the courts have held the privilege to
be inapplicable.2 35
Some would argue that, since an aviator's livelihood
may depend on his license, that license constitutes a prop-
229 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 546, 565 (1892); Hashagen v. United
States, 283 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1960).
230 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951).
2 See Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 45 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
905. Contra Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
233 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1429(b), 1471(a) (West Supp. 1985) (FAA limited to civil
penalties not to exceed $1,000.00 and certificate actions). But see id. at § 1472
(1982) (list of specific violations of federal aviation laws for which criminal sanc-
tions are authorized).
2-4 Cf French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (M.D.N.C. 1973), afd,
443 U.S. 901 (1979) (privilege does not apply to preclude statements made by
patient to psychiatrist from introduction at involuntary commitment proceeding).
See also Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or. 95, 570 P.2d 52 (1977).
235 E.g., Mississippi State Bar v. Attorney-Respondent in Disciplinary Proceed-
ing, 367 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1979).
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erty right to the degree that the sanction of revocation is
quasi-criminal in nature. However, only meager support
for the proposition exists.236 A better approach may be to
argue that a witness' answer could subject him to both
civil and criminal liability - a risk he cannot be forced to
undertake.
Because aviation safety is the primary concern of FAA
and NTSB investigators, immunity should be sought and
granted when fifth amendment issues arise. The hearing
officer or investigator should be petitioned for this pro-
tection. However, the power to grant federal immunity
lies with the Department of Justice.2 37 An attorney nego-
tiating immunity for a client who will be questioned by the
FAA or NTSB should seek "use" immunity from prosecu-
tion for any actions about which he has testified. Counsel
should be aware, however, that in some cases only "trans-
actional" immunity may be granted if the witness enjoys
protection against incrimination in other jurisdictions. 23 8
Risks attend the assertion of the privilege. Generally,
neither prosecutor nor judge may comment on the asser-
tion of the privilege, nor in many states can a negative
inference be drawn in civil litigation. 3 9 In some jurisdic-
tions, however, a jury in conventional civil litigation can
be told to consider a party's invocation of the privilege.240
Probably the greatest practical concern of most wit-
nesses and their counsel, when they consider whether to
assert the privilege, is the reaction of federal officials to
that assertion. Some officials may see it as an obstruction
of their efforts to discover information which will aid in
investigations designed to promote aviation safety. They
236 Cf Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (forfeiture of goods
amounted to a "criminal" case for purposes of fifth amendment proceedings).
237 See 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982).
238 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
2-9 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611-14 (1965). See also Supreme
Court Draft of FED. R. EvID. 513(a) (forbidding negative inference to be drawn);
UNIF. R. EvID. 512 (adopted in a number of states) (no negative inference).
240 See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank v.John E. Russo Produce Co., 50 N.Y.2d 31,
405 N.E.2d 205, 212 (1980); Arthur v. Stern, 560 F.2d 477, 478 (1st Cir. 1979).
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may even perceive the assertion of the privilege as an indi-
cation that the witness feels guilty. However, the FAA has
a good reputation for not resorting to regulatory back-
lash, and the individual aviator should consider the risk of
incurring the disfavor of the FAA, which is mild compared
to criminal prosecution. Arguments both pro and con
about the risks of asserting the privilege have been the
subject of in depth debate by commentators.2 4'
2. Search and Seizure
Not infrequently, local law enforcement agents or fed-
eral regulatory officials seek to search an airplane, hangar,
or pilot's bag. The constitution requires essentially that
government agents have probable cause to search a per-
son or place and have a warrant. 24 2 Under certain circum-
stances - consent searches, searches incident to arrest,
hot pursuit, vehicle searches, and emergency searches due
to exigent circumstances - authorities may be able to
search without a warrant, but the probable cause require-
ment remains. 43
A search or seizure takes place when a government
agent or official infringes on a person's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.244 In the aviation context, this may in-
clude a pilot's flight bag, and may include the airplane
cockpit. If, by an objective standard, a person has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, examination by the gov-
ernment does not constitute a search.245 The same rule
applies to corporations and other business enterprises
who also enjoy the same protections against unreasonable
search and seizure. 246
When government agents conduct a valid search, virtu-
241 Compare Pangia, supra note 225, at 584-588 with Hamilton, Administrative Prac-
tice Before the FAA and NTSB: Problems, Trends and Developments, 46 J. AIR L. & CoM.
615, 618-25 (1981).
242 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959).
243 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
244 Id. at 361 (Douglas, J., concurring).
24-1 See id.
2411 G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977).
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ally any tangible or intangible item to which a nexus with
criminal activity can be established may be seized.24 7 Such
evidence includes fruits of crime, instrumentalities for
committing crime, weapons, contraband, and evidentiary
material related to criminal activity. 24 8
There are certain general limitations placed on officials
searching with a warrant and on the scope of their search.
Probable cause to search must exist at the time the search
is conducted, not just when the warrant is obtained.24 9
Any federal nighttime search must be conducted pursuant
to rule 41 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which require a showing of special circumstances.250 Un-
less exigent circumstances exist, the officer or agent must
knock and announce his presence before entering.25'
"Pretext searches," where officers pretend to search for a
legally sufficient reason, but in fact search for other rea-
sons, are disfavored.25 2 No time limit restricts the dura-
tion of a search; unless government agents complete or
abandon their search, it may be resumed within a reason-
able time.253 These rules will presumably apply to
searches of fixed base operators, hangars, and baggage
rooms.
Special rules will usually apply with respect to searches
of aircraft. Generally, where time pressures and emer-
gency situations exist, such exigent circumstances may ob-
viate the search warrant requirement 254 The exigent
247 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1966).
248 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 2.4
(1985).
249 Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1932).
2- FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1) provides in part: "The warrant shall be served in
the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant,
and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than
daytime."
251 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958).
252 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960). "The deliberate use by the
government of an administrative warrant for the purpose of gathering evidence in
a criminal case must meet stern resistance by the courts." Id.
2-5 See United States v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236, 241 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 908 (1966).
2-14 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1979).
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circumstances doctrine has been applied most frequently
to searches of vehicles; the inherent mobility of
automobiles makes it practically impossible to obtain a
search warrant and still maintain control over the vehi-
cle.255 This argument would seem to apply afortiori to air-
craft. Although the United States Supreme Court has not
specifically stated that the automobile search exception
covers aircraft, some lower courts have held that the "exi-
gent circumstances" doctrine does so apply.256 Govern-
ment agents have authority to search the entire passenger
compartment of a car when arresting a driver or occu-
pant.2 57 They can also search any area or compartment of
the vehicle which they have probable cause to believe con-
tains contraband or any other seizable material. 58
Electronic devices used to track moving objects
("beepers") are a favorite tool of law enforcement of-
ficers, particularly when aircraft are involved. Courts have
split on whether the use of beepers to track vehicles con-
stitutes a search requiring a warrant. 259 There may be a
developing trend to hold that the use of beepers attached
to the exterior of an airplane does not require a search war-
rant. 260 The Supreme Court has reasoned that the exte-
rior of a vehicle is subject to a greatly reduced expectation
of privacy. 261 However, to enter the interior of an aircraft
and place electronic surveillance equipment therein re-
quires a search warrant because of the greater privacy ex-
255 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
256 See United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530, 532 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 335 (1983); United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122, 124-25 (10th Cir. 1979).
257 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). This is commonly seen as an
outgrowth of the Chimel doctrine. Under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-
63 (1969), police are allowed to seize anything in the "grabbing radius" of the
arrestee at the time of his arrest. If Belton is not an expansion, but only an applica-
tion of Chimel, searches of larger vehicles - and airplane interiors - will probably
not be allowed beyond that area within the "grabbing radius" of the person ar-
rested. However, if Belton is to be applied to the entire interior of an aircraft there
may be serious ramifications for aviators.
258 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817, 825 (1982).
259 See Annot., 47 A.L.R. FED. 646 (1982).
2 o E.g., United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976).
261 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
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pectation.2 62 The use of beepers has been permitted for
detecting the location of rented aircraft when the device is
installed with the consent of the owner. 263
The practitioner representing aviation clients should be
aware of the special treatment given to searches con-
ducted by administrative agencies. Although fourth
amendment protections do apply to administrative
searches,264 such searches are not restricted by the same
rigid probable cause requirements that apply to searches
conducted by more typical law enforcement agencies.
Technically, probable cause is required for administrative
searches, but a more liberal "balancing test" is used to
weigh the need to search against the risk of invasion of
265privacy. Administrative agencies can also subpoena
business records, but such a demand for records must be
limited in scope and may not be unreasonably
burdensome. 66
In the realm of administrative searches, an exception
exists which may be important to aviators and their coun-
sel. "Pervasively regulated" industries do not enjoy prob-
able cause protection, even for an administrative search.
Participants in such pervasively regulated industries are
subject to a "long tradition of close governmental super-
vision" and therefore have a diminished expectation of
2.2 See United States v. One 1967 Cessna Aircraft, 454 F. Supp. 1352, 1355
(C.D. Cal. 1978); United States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146, 149 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
But see United States v. Tussell, 441 F. Supp. 1092, 1105 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (no
expectation of privacy against law enforcement beeper where FAA regulation re-
quires that aircraft like the subject plane carry emergency locator transmitters).
263 United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
896 (1978); United States v. Cheshire, 569 F.2d 887, 888-89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591, 591-92 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977). But see United States v. One 1967 Cessna Aircraft,
454 F. Supp. 1352 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (seller's authorization to use beeper not suffi-
cient against subsequent buyer).
2- See Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
265 See id. at 538. The probable cause needed is a "reasonable legislative or
administrative standard for conducting an area inspection." Id.
2- See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1967). An agency may issue a demand
to inspect records, but if a subject company wishes ajudicial determination of the
propriety of a subpoena, the subpoena may not be enforced on the business site.
Id.
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privacy.26 7 Thus far, the Supreme Court has limited the
''pervasively regulated business doctrine" to sales of li-
quor 268 and firearms 269, and to a more limited extent, to
underground and surface mining safety inspections.270
However, lower courts have applied the doctrine to other
heavily regulated industries. 27' The concept has not yet
been directly applied to the aviation industry. 272 This is a
sensitive area for operators and manufacturers that may
be subjected to invasions of privacy since aviation is cer-
tainly an industry subject to pervasive federal
regulation.273
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, when attorneys representing clients em-
ployed in the aviation industry learned that a serious acci-
dent had occurred in which their client might be
implicated, they became concerned about a lawsuit or an
FAA Enforcement Action. Now there is a trend for prose-
cutors to scrutinize accidents involving multiple deaths or
mass disasters, aggravated circumstances, and parties who
are the focus of media interest. Thus, conduct which was
only negligent when committed in the air may be treated
as manslaughter by the courts. When this happens, coun-
267 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) (quoting Colonnade Ca-
tering v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)).
268 Colonnade Catering v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-77 (1970).
269 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-17 (1972).
270 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-606 (1981).
27i Businesses which have been included in the pervasively regulated category
include pharmacies (United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F. 2d 682
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974)); massage parlors (Pollard v. Cockrell,
578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1978)); and insurance companies (United States v.
Gordon, 655 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1981)). However, the fact that a business is in
interstate commerce and subject to health, safety, and wage regulations will not
necessarily mean that it is pervasively regulated and subject to warrantless
searches. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 313-14.
272 The court in Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394,
396-401 (7th Cir. 1976), held that 49 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1982) did not give the
C.A.B. inspection powers equal to that of a continuing search warrant. The court
reasoned that the evils inherent in the gun and liquor industries, which justify
warrantless searches, do not exist in the field of public transportation. Id. at 399.
273 See generally Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1501 (1982).
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sel may be faced with ambiguously worded standards of
criminal negligence, which may criminalize conduct that
would otherwise be aggravated civil negligence. He may
also face multi-faceted litigation, in which developments
in one proceeding may permanently affect the rights of his
client in another. The foregoing, then, has raised some of
the major issues that may confront counsel should he find
himself in this different dimension of practice - the
"Twilight Zone" between civil, criminal, and administra-
tive litigation.
